Chair,
We are witnessing a deteriorating global security environment with wars, conflict and rising tension. Bilateral arms control has expired. Reduction in stockpiles have
stalled.
The situation underscores the urgency to work towards the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We must increase our efforts to prepare the ground for future
disarmament by actively rebuilding confidence – and find ways to ensure progress also when trust is absent. We must use the time now effectively so real progress becomes
possible when global conditions allow.
Chair,
Let me highlight five points:
First, the three core principles of nuclear disarmament - verification, irreversibility and transparency - should be given priority in our work. Previous Review Conferences have repeatedly acknowledged their indispensable role to sustainable nuclear disarmament and a world without nuclear weapons.
Work on nuclear disarmament verification has shown that progress on disarmament is possible. Two very successful Group of Governmental Experts have paved the way for the establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on nuclear disarmament verification, which will start its work in January.
Irreversibility is historically less well explored but is gaining increasing attention. There is an intimate relationship between the three principles. Discussing disarmament in the abstract has limited value.
These three principles offer a practical approach to disarmament: to envision concretely what a disarmament process could look like, and what components it could involve.
Second, we strongly support confidence-building measures, including greater transparency from the Nuclear-Weapon States. Transparency is an essential feature of the NPT, and a key enabler for accountability. We welcome Nuclear-Weapon States national reporting as an important tool but regret that reporting remains uneven. We need reporting by all, in greater detail, and a system for structured engagement.
We need political will and commitment. Not attempts to deflect attention through unfounded claims against NATO’s extended deterrence—an arrangement that predated the NPT and was essential to its very feasibility.
Third, we encourage all NWS to take active and practical steps to reduce nuclear risks. Risk reduction is not a precondition for disarmament, but it can be critical to ensure we have a tomorrow in which disarmament can take place. We appreciate efforts from the US, UK and France, to promote dialogue on risk reduction and strategic stability, and we welcome the US proposal for a multilateral arms control-process. Pre-launch notifications pursuant to the Hague Code of Conduct is an important risk-reducing measure that we encourage all to join.
Fourth, the CTBT is fundamentally linked to the NPT. Its negotiation was part of the package that enabled the indefinite extension of the NPT. Its early entry into force was identified as a priority step toward implementing Article VI. For three decades, it
has contributed to a powerful norm: no nuclear test explosions, anywhere, by anyone.
Fifth, the focus on humanitarian consequences is an important aspect of the work on nuclear disarmament. It shifts the discourse from purely strategic considerations to the catastrophic consequences a nuclear conflict will have for people and the environment. That is, after all, the core reason why we all deeply care for and want nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Chair,
Nuclear disarmament can only be achieved through balanced, mutual, irreversible and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The NPT is the cornerstone of our collective efforts. We must do our utmost to ensure continued strong and unconditional support for the NPT.
Let’s start by picking the lowest-hanging fruit of them all: a reaffirmation of previous Review Conference commitments.
Thank you.