Chair,
Congratulations on the assumption of your duties.
For 55 years the NPT has protected us from proliferation of nuclear weapons whilst creating conditions for peaceful uses of nuclear power and technology. The great reductions in nuclear weapons after the Cold War could hardly have taken place without the NPT regime. Its successes are the fruit of sustained hard work. Through the efforts of Member States and the IAEA in particular, the NPT is being implemented every day.
We must not take the NPT for granted. The global security architecture is under immense pressure. We have to work hard to safeguard it.
In 2022 Russia brutally attacked Ukraine from behind a shield of nuclear weapons, shredding its legally binding negative security guarantees in the Budapest Memorandum. In the three years since, nuclear threats from Russia have become commonplace. Through this, Russia is directly stimulating an increasing salience of nuclear weapons worldwide.
The humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic.
The DPRK seriously harms global non-proliferation efforts. It continues to pursue its illegal nuclear and missiles programmes, violating binding UN Security Council resolutions, thereby escalating nuclear risks and creating proliferation pressures in Asia and globally. The DPRK has also actively joined the side of the aggressor in Russia’s war on Ukraine. The increasing alignment between Russia and the DPRK is a cause of concern for the non-proliferation regime.
China, on the other hand, is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, pushing the world to the brink of a new nuclear arms race. Compounding this is China’s complete lack of transparency and accountability, which increases the risk of misperceptions and misunderstandings.
Chair,
Proliferation pressures are mounting. We have become too used to the successes of Pillar 2. Now is the time to double down on defending it, ensuring that non-proliferation and non-nuclear weapon status remain irreversible.
We have heard criticism of extended nuclear deterrence from some delegations. However, these nuclear sharing arrangements precede the NPT and are in line with the Treaty. This is also one of the reasons why non-proliferation has been so successful.
Iran remains a nonproliferation concern. The IAEA plays a decisive role in verifying the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Norway fully supports the IAEA’s role and work. We welcome the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the Unites States on a nuclear agreement. An agreement which provided reassurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme would have significant positive impact regionally as well as globally.
Chair,
The NPT has been through tense times before. The review conference next year provides us with a good opportunity to reaffirm our core principles, commitments and aspirations, and get back on track. To underscore our common expectation that the nuclear powers start working on risk reduction and new arms control agreements. We welcome President Trump’s call in January for a arms control dialogue with Russia and China. We urge China and Russia to reciprocate.
Success at the RevCon depends on the work we do today. The third PrepCom is mandated not only to sort out various procedural issues, but to make substantive recommendations to the RevCon. We will aim to make as practical interventions as possible, with a view to fulfilling the mandate of this PrepCom.
Finally, let me underscore the importance of transparency. The nuclear weapon states (NWS) have a special responsibility. Obviously. This comes with their special status. The reporting of the NWS is of particular interest and importance to the NPT community. This is how we can hold the NWS to account. Yet, for all the work that went into the reporting standard more than a decade ago, it is still lacking. And the NWS do not report uniformly. We need to allocate time for a discussion of this issue at RevCon.
We need the NWS reports to be presented individually, and to have an interactive debate with them on the contents of their reports. We need to have this at the next RevCon and during the next Review Cycle. If this third PrepCom were to make only one recommendation, this should be it.
Thank you