Chair,
Wars, conflict and rising geopolitical tensions are increasing nuclear risks. High levels of
tension demand urgent attention to risk reduction. Threats of nuclear use are
intolerable.
The DPRK’s continued build-up of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are
unacceptable. We call on the DPRK to comply with its international obligations and
engage in a dialogue for denuclearisation. We also remain deeply concerned about
Iran’s nuclear programme and call on Iran to grant the IAEA access to all nuclear
facilities necessary for effective inspections and verification.
Russia’s repeated nuclear threats and development of new nuclear-weapon systems
increases arms-racing, proliferation pressures and undermines strategic stability.
Chair,
We urge China to show greater transparency. The rapid and opaque increase in nuclear
arsenal is of profound concern. An acknowledgment that there are numerical increases,
would be a meaningful step towards building greater confidence.
We call on Russia and China to accept the invitation by the US to engage in strategic
stability dialogue which can help prevent miscalculation and escalation. Risk reduction
is not instead of disarmament. It helps ensure there is a future in which to disarm.
Chair,
An effective ban on nuclear tests is vital. The CTBT plays a crucial role. Until it enters into force, all States must uphold the moratoria. Further strengthening capabilities to detect and verify low-yield nuclear explosions could reinforce the Treaty’s verification regime.
Negotiations on a FMCT should begin without further delay, building confidence,
supporting non-proliferation and – eventually – disarmament. Existing stocks should be
included. Meanwhile, all nuclear-armed States should declare moratoria on such
production.
The IAEA is indispensable to the implementation of the NPT. Its verification and
safeguards activities help ensure that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful
purposes to nuclear weapons, simultaneously underpinning non-proliferation and
international cooperation on peaceful uses.
We call on all Member States to support three interrelated principles of nuclear
disarmament: transparency, verification and irreversibility. Advancing them builds
confidence today and supports future negotiations. This work does not replace
disarmament. It enables it by laying practical foundations for the steps ahead.
Finally, we want to thank the UNODA for their briefing and their thorough efforts implementing the resolution establishing the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, and repeat our appreciation of the broad support expressed by Member States for this work.
Thank you.