Chair,
I will make seven points.
First,
Peaceful uses, non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing. This basic principle runs through all the major disarmament treaties. Nuclear science, biotechnology, space systems, digital technologies and artificial intelligence are transforming how we treat disease, connect societies and drive economic development.
Access to these technologies will be critical to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Norway firmly believes that their peaceful use is an inalienable right of all States.
Humanity has never possessed more powerful tools. But the benefits of technology are also accompanied by risks, exacerbated by a deteriorating security environment. Export controls are essential. They are not obstacles to peaceful cooperation. They are enablers, indispensable to prevent proliferation while facilitating trade, science and peaceful cooperation.
Second,
Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has direct implications across this Committee’s agenda. Waged from behind a shield of nuclear threats, Russia is deliberately using nuclear risk as a tool to support its war.
The scale and magnitude of Russia’s ongoing violations of international law and its reckless nuclear behaviour is not a regional issue, it is a systemic risk to us all.
Third,
We are entering a new era of nuclear competition and risk.
Risk reduction is urgent.
Dialogue among the major nuclear powers is a first step. We welcome the substantive exchanges among the Nuclear Weapon-States at the NPT Review Conference in May on risk reduction and strategic stability, and encourage China and Russia to accept the United States' repeated invitations to engage in a multilateral strategic stability dialogue. The states with the three largest nuclear arsenals have a special responsibility. We also call on states not signatory, to join the Hague Code of Conduct.
Fourth,
Ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used again is in the interest of the very survival of humanity. The humanitarian consequences would be catastrophic. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
We must double down to defend the existing architecture.
The NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The Treaty continues to deliver through the indispensable work of the IAEA. The lack of progress in three consecutive Review Conferences is, however, not acceptable. The next review cycle must deliver across all three pillars.
Entry into force of the CTBT should be a priority for all. Pending that, nuclear testing moratoria must be maintained.
Preservation is, however, not good enough. We must uphold our collective ambition for progress. Some of our most significant milestones were reached at times of tremendous great-power tension.
Progress on arms control and disarmament may seem difficult today, but windows of opportunity can open suddenly. We must be ready.
Working on verification is a way to prepare. It builds confidence today and develops the tools, expertise and networks needed to craft future agreements. We call on all to support the work of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on nuclear disarmament verification, which starts in 2027.
Fifth,
Artificial intelligence is reshaping international security. Advanced AI amplifies existing threats and creates new security risks. Its effects extend from cyber operations and biotechnology to nuclear decision-making and autonomous weapons systems. We encourage all States to join the call by the President of Finland and the Prime Minister of Norway to address the most severe risks from advanced AI.
Human judgement, control and accountability must remain at the centre of decisions that affect human life and international peace and security.
This must also guide our work on autonomous weapons systems. The consensus outcome in the GGE on LAWS provides a sufficient basis for negotiations on an instrument to start. The CCW Review Conference should mandate such negotiations.
Sixth,
Biotechnology and AI are advancing rapidly. The BWC must keep pace. We cannot wait for catastrophe before strengthening the regime designed to prevent one. The BWC Working Group must deliver a meaningful outcome in December.
The prohibition on chemical weapons is clear. Russia’s use of chloropicrin in Ukraine shows the cost of allowing violations of the CWC to go unanswered. Every use must be condemned, investigated and met with accountability to preserve the norm against chemical warfare.
Finally,
Strategic competition is intensifying in cyberspace and outer space, increasing the risk of misunderstanding, escalation and conflict. In cyberspace, Norway reaffirms its support for the UN framework for responsible State behaviour, and the new UN Global Mechanism on ICT Security.
We call for focused work in OEWG PAROS to reduce space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour.
Thank you.